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2002 Otto L. Walter Lecture:
Multidisciplinary Practice and the
European Court of Justice,
DEAN MATASAR*: Welcome, everyone, to the 2002 Otto L. Walter
Lecture: Multidisciplinary Practice and the European Court of Justice. My
name is Rick Matasar. I am the Dean of New York Law School, and I'm
really pleased to welcome you here on behalf of all my colleagues at the law
school.
My job is very simple today. It is to set up our conversation with a quick
introduction of the panel and its topic, and then it is my great pleasure to turn
things over to Terry Cone, who directs the International Law Center here at
New York Law School. This series honors Dr. Otto Walter, a 1954 graduate
of New York Law School, and I must say that when you look through Otto's
incredible record of achievement, it suggests exactly why it is that we are so
delighted to have this lecture series in his honor.
He was a lawyer in Germany and left that country at a time of great
turmoil in its history and came here, and much as many people have discovered when they come to the United States with a foreign law degree, you
cannot immediately practice law, and Dr Walter came to this country and set
up his own business and eventually received his law degree from New York
Law School. He then had a distinguished career as a practitioner, a member of
our faculty, and in his honor, this series has been created to talk about things
international and, in a very particular way, to talk about things that involve
international business transactions and their major impact on the world of
commerce between all of us.
Our panel today are many distinguished individuals from different walks
of life. We have Anthony Huydecoper, who is here from the Netherlands as
our Advocate-General with the Supreme Court in the Netherlands. Bob MacCrate, who, as we know, is the senior counsel at Sullivan and Cromwell or, as
we like to say, the senior counsel to all of us and all of our curious walks of
life. And Deborah Schenk, who is here from NYU Law School to lend her
expertise as a professor of tax law and one who has been doing a lot of thinking on these questions of multidisciplinary practice.
It goes without saying that we are facing a time when issues of multidisciplinary practice are an acute focus for all of us. One of the histories of
things we can say about New York and our particular take on the question of
1. The lecture was held in the Wellington Conference Center at New York Law School on
March 7, 2002.
* Richard A. Matasar is Dean and President of New York Law School and Professor of
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multidisciplinary practice is the most important international center in the
country, at the forefront of thinking about issues of multidisciplinary practice.
What can we say about our country at a time when we've had an interesting take on the role of lawyers and the role of accountants in providing highlevel advice to their clients on how to manage their businesses, and what challenges that may lead us into thinking about the questions of multidisciplinary
practice.
We could not have a more timely discussion given the recent actions of
the European Court in this regard. It is with great pleasure today that I want to
turn over the festivities to Terry Cone, who directs the Center for International
Law at New York Law School. And before Terry gets up, it looks like he has
to be embarrassed, appropriately. I want to say that it is one of our great
pleasures in having Terry as our colleague here at New York Law School. He
has that breadth of experience that comes from being a high-level practitioner
in a major law firm, which never goes unmentioned here at New York Law
School, Cleary, Gottlieb.
It goes without saying that Terry brings to the plate as an academic all of
the skills that all of us have, but he brings that wonderful niche that comes
from somebody that has done it in the trenches for a long period of time in the
fields of international business transactions. We are absolutely privileged to
have him as our colleague, and he always brings to us an interesting discussion
and an interesting panel.
So Terry, on behalf of all of us, welcome, and lead us off.
PROFESSOR CONE*: It's always reassuring to have your Dean tell you
that you are welcome. All of you are welcome.
The Dean mentioned the central place that New York occupies in the
discussion of today's subject matter. I don't want to take up any more time
than absolutely necessary because you came here to listen to Anthony
Huydecoper, Robert MacCrate, and Deborah Schenk, and not to me.
But I would like to say just a word about New York. I am personally
touched to have Mary Daly, a professor at Fordham Law School, who came
today. She was the "reporter," or Reporter, on the American Bar Association's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, and she certainly has been a
major national and international figure in the area. I am most grateful she is
here. I also want to mention Steven Krane, who is with us. He is the President of the New York State Bar Association, and he has been most active in
the New York State Bar Association's per curium work on the subject of multidisciplinary practice.
Joining us right this moment is Otto Walter. Otto, your chair is there, sir.
Let's all greet Dr. Walter, for whom this lecture was made, by greeting him
with a round of applause.
* Sydney M. Cone, HI is the C.V. Starr Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
International Law at New York Law School and Of Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton.
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The timeliness of today's event, which the Dean mentioned, is partly fortuitous and partly the result of planning. The European Court of Justice has
had before it for some time a case 2 relating to multidisciplinary practice, a case
brought by two of the "Big Five" accounting firms 3 against the Bar of the
Netherlands. The European Court of Justice reached its decision two weeks
and two days ago, so this is a timely conference/lecture.
The lecturer, the Otto L. Walter Lecturer, is Anthony Huydecoper. He is
an Advocate-General in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. He was the
President of the Dutch Bar when the litigation started. He has also been the
Chairman of the committee of the European Bar Association that has considered questions relating to multidisciplinary practice.
You came to hear him and not me. We should all be grateful that he has
come here from the Netherlands to talk to us. I personally am very grateful he
agreed to do this, and I am very proud and happy in presenting Anthony
Huydecoper.
MR. HUYDECOPER*: Thank you, Terry, and thank you ladies and
gentleman.
It is a very distinct privilege to be here today. It is my first visit to New
York after September of last year, and I must say that both my wife and I we are both here together - have been amazed and very much impressed by
the optimism, fortitude, and determination which the city exudes when you
come into it and stay in it for a few days. It is truly encouraging to see so
much patriotism and so much determination to cope with this disaster, and I
think I should start by complementing the people of New York, which includes I suspect most of you, on this amazing spirit of mine. It is really very
comforting for a foreigner to see that and a great pleasure to be in such a place
at this time.
Having said that, I'm afraid I must now begin on the subject of multidisciplinary practice, which is at a very different level and for many, it may not
have that degree of fascination which it has for those who have been occupied
with it and in the trenches for a number of years. It is a fascinating subject. I
was confirmed of that by seeing that this lecture was announced in TIME OUT.
A reason for me to be particularly pleased is that it's the first and probably
only time that my name will be mentioned in TImE OUT.
2. Case C-309/99, JCJ Wouters, JW Savelbergh, Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV
v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Council of the Bars and Law
Societies of European Union, intervener) (2002).
3. The "Big Five" accounting fins are the five largest public accounting firms that practice internationally. These firms are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
* Anthony Huydecoper is Advocate-General to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands and
Former Chair of the Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice of the European Association of
Bar Organizations. Mr. Huydecoper was President of the Netherlands Bar Association when it
was sued by the plaintiffs in the case on multidisciplinary practice that went before the European Court of Justice. See supra note 2.
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I am well aware that I do not know the full ramifications of the developments in the United States on this subject, and it may therefore well be that I
will say things that are either incorrect or inexplicable to you, talking from my
Dutch experience or my European experience. It that case, I suggest that you
interrupt vehemently and directly, correct me, or ask a question, because there
is no point in me saying things that you don't understand and stand uncorrected. I expect and encourage you to leap up immediately and say, I cannot
follow what you are saying, and would you please try to make sense of it. I
will try when you holler, but I hope to be encouraged and corrected by you.
The subject of multidisciplinary practice is one that excites considerable
emotion by those involved in it, amongst those involved in it, and the attitude
of course common when disputes arise has been noted to paint pictures of
good guys and bad guys and to take the opportunity to vilify the other side and
the position it takes. Much though I would enjoy doing that, I think it is better
to approach the problem from a less emotional standpoint. This is typically
one of those legal questions where there are weighty and sensible arguments
on both sides, where both sides have honorable positions to defend and where,
in the end, it is the nice balance of legal argument that must decide the question and wherein, my refrain; there is no real good guy or bad guy to be
painted to you. I will therefore forego the temptation of discussing the Andersen/Enron problem. I think it is totally irrelevant to today's issue. Any profession and any individual firm can make mistakes, grievous mistakes, and
these are likely to influence public debate and public opinion, but they do not
really have bearing on the balance of interests which is crucial to deciding the
policy of MDPs. 4 That is the position I take.
That is not a question of an unduly ethical position on my part or altruism. It is a question of putting the matter in the right perspective because it is
indeed crucial to the debate on MDPs to see that the arguments on both sides
are weighty and honorable and that it is precisely because they are weighty
and honorable that one may well be tempted to make the wrong decision in the
daily practice of the MDP that we are considering as a possibility. It is far
more easy to be distracted from the right course by argument that is honorable
and that is sensible than to be distracted by argument that is clearly false. To
make the wrong choice on the basis of sensible and honorable arguments is
therefore a bigger risk than to do it in the face of argument that is either false
or evil.
The problem with MDPs, I'm sure, is familiar to all of you. Nevertheless, I can hardly forgo depicting that problem, saying to begin with that although there are a variety of conceivable possibilities of multidisciplinary
practice, what we are actually confronted with is a limited field of that, and
that is integrated form of practice, practice where the various professionals
amalgamate or merge or form some other forms of legitimate cooperation and
4. Multidisciplinary practices.
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where one of the groups of professionals involved are accountants. I realize
that there are a variety of other possible forms of MDP and even some that are
actually practiced, although on a more limited scale, but the debate has concentrated almost exclusively on the cooperation with accountants, and as that
has its own particularities, I propose to limit myself to that, realizing meanwhile that there are various other forms of MDP that could become relevant at
some future date, but it would really be going very far out to discuss them
right now.
In the question whether accountants and lawyers should be allowed to
practice in integrated form, that is to say in one form or another of amalgamation or merger, it is the position taken by bars in many countries of the world
that there are two, or depending on where you look at it, three essential values
of the legal profession that could be compromised and that need to be considered or need to be safeguarded in allowing or disallowing this kind of practice.
It has come to me time and again when discussing MDP problems with nonlawyers or people who are not actually involved in the bar practice that these
values are often misperceived or misunderstood or dealt with lightly by persons who are not intimately acquainted with them, which can at times create
the impression that these values do not amount to much if an outsider doesn't
immediately understand and appreciate their importance. The time has come
for those who are involved with those values to question whether they are all
that important.
I will try to present this objectively, of course, but I will not dissimulate
that I have a very pronounced opinion on the subject. Yes, they are important,
and yes, the bars in many countries of the world - in fact, practically all the
countries I've come across - have a perfectly sensible position in considering, safeguarding, and defending these particular values.
What are the values we are talking about? I am sure you are familiar with
them all. The key words are independence and confidentiality. Independence
in this respect is a word that is widely misused because it has a number of
different meanings. The meaning that is crucial to the present debate is the
independence required of a lawyer in that, when defending the interests of the
client, he allows no other interest whatsoever to be his guide. I am talking of
course of the legitimate interests of his client. That goes without saying, but it
better said nevertheless. In defending legitimate interests of the client, those
interests are the only thing the lawyer should be guided by. No other interests
whatsoever.
There are other meanings of the word independence, one of which we
will come across presently. That is independence of the bar itself, the autonomous position taken by the bar. I mention that to avoid confusion now because in this European Court's decision, that form of independence will also
play a certain role, but the independence that is central to the debate is the
independence which consists of a lawyer should allow no other interests except that of his client to guide his actions and his practice.
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I said at the beginning of this talk that it is particularly difficult to maintain that principle when confronted with other interests that are not dishonorable, but that are very sensible and honorable. It is particularly dangerous for a
lawyer to be confronted with other interests that he feels, and rightly he may
feel, that also deserve consideration and to be upheld, and then to maintain that
he should not allow those interests to guide him, but should allow his client's
interests alone to guide him. I said at the beginning of this talk that that is to
my point, that to my opinion, something that is often underestimated in the end
of the debate. It is not - the problem confronting us is not so much that a
lawyer will do the wrong thing, knowing that he is being lead up the wrong
alley. The problem is that the lawyer may well be perfectly justified in allowing other honorable interests to steer his course when in fact, he should be
concentrating only on his clients interests and not, for instance, on the interests
of the public at large or justice at large.
Particularly, the interests of the public at large come to mind because that
is one of the interests the accountancy profession finds itself very compelled to
uphold. The accountants state, and I am not contesting that that is true, state
that they have the public interest at least partly to serve and not only their
clients' interests. Now that, I'm sure we will all agree, is a perfectly honorable, valid interest and one that does not immediately spring to mind as one that
we shouldn't be guided by, but for a lawyer it is very obvious that he shouldn't
be guided by the public interest or any other similar interest when dealing in
matters for his client. He shouldn't confuse the two when dealing in matters
for a client. It's a client's interests alone that should be served. What is confusing and very likely to lead to problems is when you start mixing in these
other, in themselves, quite honorable and valid interests, and then find yourself
unable to distinguish the two.
It is that independence which is the first part of the debate. Added to that
is the avoidance of conflicts of interests. Some people see that as a separate
entity. I myself am inclined to think that it is merely a manifestation of the
general rule that a lawyer should be guided by his client's interests alone, and
he cannot be guided by his client's interests alone if he has accepted to deal
with conflicting interests because obviously, you can't have it both ways there.
Whether you want to see that as a separate issue or the same is a matter of
taste rather than substance.
Now, in dealing with this question of independence, of course we are
confronted with the argument that you cannot hope ever to achieve purity of
independence of lawyers. Any lawyer, however much dedicated and motivated to do the right thing, cannot avoid being subject to some external interests: his own firm's, his own financial interests, possibly his family, political,
or religious interests. It is not possible at all times to divorce the lawyer as a
person completely from all these interests, and I agree with that argument.
That's quite true. You can't have it 100% pure, but of course it is a fallacy to
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think that there is no point in trying to get as far as you can in safeguarding the
lawyer from the propitious influence of other interests and his acting as such.
At a certain point at the height of the debate in Holland, someone in the
audience asked me - I had gotten carried away a bit, I must admit - and he
asked whether the bar in Holland allowed a lawyer to get married, and I had to
admit that the bar has never thought about prohibiting that. We seriously discussed it after that, of course, and we're working on it, but as the matter stands
now, I guess a lawyer in Holland is permitted to get married and thus enter
into a possible conflict of interest, and I think most of us who have practiced
law have had it first hand, haven't we? The interests of the client insisting that
you stay after 9:00 in the office and the interests of the other partner in the
marriage suggesting that it might be time to stop furthering the client's interests and do something about the family. Very difficult to avoid, they say, very
difficult to achieve absolute purity in the observance of the client's interests,
when we should try.
In another debate in my country, again on judges and their impartiality, it
was a very interesting debate and there again, the participants got carried away
a bit. At a certain point, one of the proper dry Dutchman said, "I suppose in
the end it would be best if judges had no sex at all, and they were gender
neutral." That's another example of the difficulty of achieving absolute purity
in the role, but it should only encourage us to try to get as close as possible.
This independence question clearly interferes when you merge with a
profession that has, and very properly and very rightly, has other interests at
heart. The accountancy profession is the one that we are dealing with, and
there, the conflict that has been amply demonstrated is that accountants do not
deal exclusively with their client's interests. They are not supposed to do that.
They are supposed to take an objective stand and to also serve the interests of
the public. To do within one organization both at the same time - this is the
argument that is made against MDPs - is not possible. You cannot have this
both ways. This is like being a little pregnant. Either you serve the client's
interests or you serve the public interest, and serving both wholeheartedly at
the same time, you are not going to get very far with that.
As to confidentiality, I suppose that's a much easier problem to comprehend. Lawyers are bound and are entitled to keep any information obtained
from their clients, or in the course of dealing for a client, confidentially. That
is a very, very essential part of the lawyer's duties and of the service that a
lawyer provides to his client, and accountants in many jurisdictions - not all
of them, curiously enough - but in many jurisdictions, they owe a duty of
confidentiality up to a point, but they do not have legal privilege. The duty of
confidentiality is compromised, shall I say, by their duty also to give objective
information on what they report about their clients. You can hardly say you
are giving a true and objective picture about your client but also keeping
something behind. There is an inherent contradiction in that, and that contradiction in most jurisdictions has led to that accountants do not have full legal
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privilege, and there again in amalgamated forms of cooperation. You get into
a hopeless controversy trying to settle what information may justifiably be
kept confidential and what must be disclosed if need be. There is no proper
way to actually have that both ways
Yes, we are told by the proponents of multidisciplinary amalgamations,
there is such a way that is locally known as "Chinese walls." I think what we
have examined of the problem so far goes a long ways in showing that that is a
fallacious proposition, and if you are subject to conflicting influence as to the
interests you serve, I fail to see how you can obviate that by erecting whatever
kind of structure. These influences work on you, and you can't obviate that by
putting a wall up, or a screen, or whatever. There is no point in saying, I'm on
this side of the wall so the influence doesn't reach me. It does. It is silly to
suggest that it doesn't.
As to confidentiality, I agree that a truly watertight system of Chinese
walls - not that Chinese walls, I believe, were meant to keep out water - but
such a system might conceivably work, but that would militate against the
objectives of multidisciplinary cooperation, which is to create synergy and to,
for instance, the accountants argue that one of the advantages of multidisciplinary amalgamations is that the accountant gets more complete information
about his client, and he also receives information from the other consultants. I
say that's fine. That may very well be true, but of course that goes completely
against the duty confidentiality, and if you insist on having Chinese walls that
actually work, this advantage goes plooey immediately.
So as to independence, the walls are simply inconceivable as a workable
means, and as to confidentiality, they may theoretically be conceivable, but
most bars that I have come across have made qualms about doing that in practice and also justifiably point out that the main advantages which are argued
for in multidisciplinary practice - that is to say, synergy and better information on the client - cannot be combined with a proper system of Chinese
walls.
That is the problem of multidisciplinary practice as I understand it is also
understood in America, but it is certainly the way it is understood in Europe,
and that is the way it came before the European Court of Justice in the case
that was decided the 19'"of February last.
Perhaps it helps to understand this case if I give you a bit of background
information on the actual situation on the ground in Europe. I am only
vaguely familiar with the structure of the legal profession in America. I do
know that it is, up to a point, less completely diverse and kaleidoscopic than
the European profession is.
In Europe, where we have - or in the European Community, because
this was placed in the setting of the European Community - we have 15
Member States, each with largely differing legal traditions, a largely differing
legal system, a largely differing legal practice. To confuse matters further, at
least two of these Member States are federations which have differences from
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each federated __
. The United Kingdom, as you may be aware, has six
different bars with six different rules for the three confluent parts of the United
5
Kingdom. Germany has different systems for most of its Bundeslinder,
which lead to a totally chaotic picture.
A few of these differences are particularly relevant when speaking of the
European situation as compared with the American one. The first is that in
Europe, it is not so that all countries have a legal monopoly for the bar. I
believe this is different in America. Sometimes, to Americans when I speak to
them, it comes as a shock that there is such a barbarous thing as countries in
Northern Europe, particularly, where anyone can practice law without being
admitted to the bar, but that is the case. In the Scandinavian countries, it is
even so that someone without any qualifications can practice law and take
cases to court, with the exception perhaps of the Supreme Court, but I stand to
be corrected on that, and some other countries, including my own. Anyone
can practice law, but cannot take cases to higher courts. That is reserved for
the qualified and regulated bar, but in all these countries, the United Kingdom
being the third and fourth group there, anyone can practice law, which means
that in essence, there is nothing to stop an accountant from saying he will give
legal advice. He is entitled to do that if he understands what he is talking
about. There is no sensible objection you can make against his giving legal
advice because the law does not prohibit that. In fact, a taxi driver or a hairdresser is entitled in my country to give legal advice, and many of them give
quite sensible legal advice and at a very reasonable rate, too. Not when they
dress your hair. That's expensive, but the legal advice is relatively cheap.
The various professions, as they have arisen in Europe, also tend not only
to have formal difference, but also to be substantially very different in what
they do, which again I think is not the same as here in the United States. In
continental Europe, you have the classical tradition of advocates on the one
hand and notaires, or notaries, on the other hand. That is the classical split of
the profession, and each of the countries have derived their systems from Napoleon, from the French, which was true for a large part of continental Europe.
The English of course have their, to us, inexplicable division between solicitors and barristers, solicitors doing something vaguely akin to what both lawyers and notaries do, and barristers doing something totally different. I think
that similar divisions exist at least in Northern Ireland, and up to a point, but
only up to a certain point, in Scotland.
And then we have in most European jurisdictions qualified tax advisors,
except for the countries up north where anyone can practice law where we
have both qualified and unqualified tax advisors, and a variety of other people
doing more or less legal work, such as conveyancing, charter surveying, real
estate management - quite a kaleidoscope of different professions which
could claim to be doing legal work.
5. German states.
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Then in Europe, the bar organizations tend to be very different. There are
countries like my own, where there is one central bar organization - well
organized, if I may say so, and effective, and able to regulate and to provide
disciplinary control. There are other countries where there is no such thing
and where each local bar has its own fiefdom and, of course, tends to be a
substantial degree of discord between various bars, which means that there are
no, or practically no, national organization that sets any coherent policy,
Greece being I think the most striking example, where they have 60 local bars
and no national organization whatsoever. They meet for dinner once a year,
and I'm told that's a pretty wild dinner.
In France, a similar situation exists. There is a National Bar, but the Paris
Bar is dominating over the National Bar, and the local bars tend to be irked
over the dominance of the Paris Bar, which makes for a complex circle and
makes for very little effective policy.
Finally, there are market differences. Some countries have a surplus of
lawyers and Spain, for instance, has five times as many lawyers per capita as
Holland has, although from an ethical point of view, that should make no
difference at all. Obviously, the pressure of competition on the Spanish bar is
such that it finds it difficult to resist the influences of that pressure to a far
greater extent than a country in a more comfortable position, like for instance
Holland or Belgium.
Finally, to complete this picture in chaos, the European Community has
very wisely legislated in 1998 to the effect that any lawyer from any Member
State must be allowed the freedom to practice in any other Member State, so
that you could have an English solicitor practicing in Germany and being subject to a totally inexplicable plethora of rules, both English, German, and perhaps in between. The in between is ourselves; we're stuck in between these
two. On the whole, that makes for very difficult regulation.
You will therefore not be surprised to see that the rules on MDPs vary
very substantially from country to country and that besides varying rules, the
practice of observing these varying rules in also very different. It begins with
the traditions of the English barristers. They are the one extreme of the spectrum. They allow no cooperation with any other profession in whatever form,
and they even I think found, up to a point, do not want barristers cooperating
with other barristers. They allow it, but they think it is deplorable none the
same.
On the other side of the spectrum are the German advocates, who have
traditionally been allowed to cooperate with almost anyone and have done so
in practice. Surprisingly now, until recently, they were not allowed to cooperate with other German advocates in other linder. Why that was forbidden I
have never able to understand, but they were allowed to cooperate with tax
advisors, accountants, or for that matter gardening consultants, and some of
them did.
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In France, the striking thing is that notaires are entitled to deal in real
estate, which, in the profession of notaires in my country, is absolute sin. It
would be criminal. The idea of French notaries not only acting as real estate
agents, but actually selling and buying real estate is found completely repulsive by notaries in the rest of Europe, but that is the way it is.
As to the kind of MDP we are considering now, that is to say the lawyeraccountant MDP, the picture is much the same. It varies from countries and
professions where there is complete prohibition to countries and professions
where there is complete permissibility, more or less along the lines that I
showed you earlier. The English barristers allow no cooperation whatsoever.
The English solicitors have a wishy-washy, in between position, and they are
reconsidering that at frequent intervals so that it is always very difficult to say
what their position at any given point is, but officially - I'm
I
which I will be discussing presently - but officially, their position is that
integrated cooperation with accountants, at present, is not permitted. The
French Bar has the same position.
The German Bar does permit complete integration of accountants and
lawyers, but for Germany, there is a curious and I believe unique situation that
accountants in that country have full legal privilege. How they managed to
combine this with the obligation to objectively disclose what is going on
within their clients, I cannot tell you. They must have found some intricate
German way of solving this dilemma or at least fudging it over, but I have not
been made privy to the trick they have found for that. Anyhow, they do have
complete legal privilege, and that explains why the German situation has traditionally been dealt with differently than other countries.
Italy allows MDPs in full measure. On the other side of the Latin scale,
Spain prohibits them in most rigorous form. You should be aware, of course,
that Europe being Europe, the fact that MDPs are prohibited in France and in
Spain does not mean that they are not there. They are there, but they are
prohibited. I'm not being merely facetious. One of the reasons that MDPs are
present in Spain and France may well be that many bars have suspended disciplinary action on illegal MDPs, pending the European Court's decision, because there is not much point in going up in arms against MDPs when any
disciplinary body confronted with that will say, well, that's a very difficult
point. Why don't we leave that in abeyance for a minute and see what the
European Court does first.
I fully expect that the situation will change at least in this respect, that a
number of bars will now take up enforcement far more seriously now that the
European Court has given them encouragement on that subject.
Finally Holland, although I have so far spoken of the major EC countries,
this you may not take al contrario as to mean that Holland is not a major EC
country. It is a very small major EC country, but that situation of course is
completely irrelevant except that it was this situation that was taken to the
European Court by complete coincidence.
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In Holland we had took, in our own perception, a very liberal view. The
Dutch bar enacted a regulation in 1993 to the effect that lawyers were not
permitted to cooperate in integrated form with nonlawyers, but that they were
allowed to cooperate in integrated form with a wide variety of professionals
that did provide legal services, including patent agents, notaries, tax advisors,
and foreign lawyers. I know that you will be pleased to hear that the New
York Bar is one of the bars which our Bar Council officially recognized as one
with which you can cooperate without compromising your core values. In
effect, that makes it possible in Holland to cooperate with other practitioners
on a large scale, and this is not a hollow shell. This has happened in our
country. We have very large cooperative organizations incorporating all kinds
of practitioners either in the integrated form, which is allowed for legal practitioners, or in the form similar to the side-by-side form advocated by the Bar in
New York. These actually exist, and they work. It is not a question of having
done it on paper and sitting back with satisfaction saying that was done. No, it
actually works in practice.
So, we believe we have done our job well, and we are slightly disappointed when two accountants' firms found that they wanted something different from what we thought we had so judicially regulated. The firms next took
their case to the European Court.
At this point, I must introduce another player, and that is CCBE, and
CCBE was the party that joined on the part of the Dutch Bar before the European Court. CCBE is an acronym, a totally misleading acronym, which stands
for the Federated Organization of European Bars, the council within which the
European bars cooperate and try to formulate common policy. I may have
overemphasized the "try." It is not so bad as I made it sound. They do reach
common positions of substance quite frequently. There is a CCBE Code of
Conduct, for instance, which was reenacted in 1998 and which does lay down
rules of conduct for the entirety of the European bars. Of course, that is only a
relatively small minimum of rules, and above that, all bars have enacted each a
plethora of other rules causing this kaleidoscopic variety, which I spoke of
earlier.
CCBE has also laid down a position on multidisciplinary practice by the
proposal of the committee of which I was in Chairman at the time, so I should
be modest and quiet about this. Effectively, the position taken by CCBE is
surprising and not surprising at the same time. It is surprising that this very
varied organization, with its very differing national systems, did reach a broad
consensus on the subject, and it is not surprising that the broad consensus, in a
rather verbose way, amounts to that there are two core values that MDPs compromise, and those are the core values that I have talked about already, independence and confidentiality, and that bars would be less persuaded not to
permit MDPs, but where they are permitted should take due measures to ensure that independence and confidentiality are safeguarded to the maximum
possible.
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CCBE decided to join in the litigation in support of the Dutch Bar, and
because it was felt that this was a problem common to all European bars at two
levels: the level of the question of MDPs and the rather higher level of the
autonomy of the bars in general to be able to regulate the conduct of their
members. Here again, we reach a point which may be different for Europe
than for America. In most European jurisdictions, the bars have an autonomous position and are entitled to lay down recommendations for bar members
bindingly without any instruments from other organizations or authorities,
whereas I understand in most U.S. jurisdictions, in the end, it is either the
court or some other legislative authority that approves or promulgates the
rules, whereas the bar society merely advances suggestions or proposals for
those rules. That is not the case in Europe. In most jurisdictions, the bar has
the final say no matter what the rules shall be, and although I did make the
qualification earlier that in some countries there is no properly functioning bar
organization, in those countries you must expect a rather less effective system
of rules than in those countries where there is an effective bar organization.
It is also a matter of both concern and principle to the bars of Europe that
this autonomy of the bars should be preserved. It is felt that this, albeit maybe
on a small scale, is one of the checks and balances constitutionally required to
avoid the bar, in its most extreme form, being subjugated to government policies, the most extreme forms being those that we have witnessed in totalitarian
regimes until fairly recent dates, but even in less extreme form. When I was
Bar President, the Minister of Justice at the time, a very competent and wellmeaning Minister I should add, suggested at a certain point that criminal lawyers were going too far in the defense of their clients, and that the Bar should
be well advised to take steps against criminal lawyers who overstepped the
limits. We reacted very sharply and said that this was the typical instance
where if anyone should shut up and not involve himself or herself in the policy
of the bars, it was the Minister of Justice on a matter involving criminal justice, in which she had strong political interests. This was typically something
where the autonomy of the bars should be respected. So it is not a completely
theoretical problem, this autonomy of the bar. It does crop up from time to
time.
Why is this issue so dear to CCBE and to the Dutch Bar? Because of this
case, which was brought by, effectively, PriceWaterhouse and Andersen, Arthur Andersen at the time, they argued that the regulations of the Bar that had
an impact on competition were contrary to the laws of the European Community Treaty 6 at two levels: the level of the anticompetition provision 7 of that
treaty, which prohibits all forms of anticompetitive agreements and, within
that scope also, anticompetitive decisions or understandings of groupings of
6.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992)

[hereinafter EC TREATY]. This treaty is also referred to as the EC Treaty, European Community
Treaty, and European Treaty.
7. EC TREATY art. 81 (preY. art. 85).
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undertakings. The argument went to the effect that a bar is nothing more or
less than a grouping of law firms, and therefore a grouping of undertakings
and that any decision that affects competition by such a bar is therefore covered by the antitrust rules of the European Treaty.
The second level was that the European Treaty has a number of rules
which insist on free flow of products, services, and establishment within the
Community, 8 and it was argued that the rules of the Dutch Bar in this case
violated these free flow provisions, not of goods of course, but of services and
of establishment.
That was the problem and if accepted, it would not only have meant that
the MDP regulation 9 of the Dutch Bar would have been found invalid, but it
would effectively have meant that practically all the regulations of all the bars
in Europe would be invalid because it is very difficult to think of a regulation
made by a bar that does not have some significant impact on competition. I
think our rule that you may not lie to the judge may possibly qualify as the
only rule that does not have a significant effect on competition, unless you
believe it is a competitive advantage to be allowed to lie to the judge, but most
all the rules on compulsory education, on compulsory insurance, on admission
to the bar, have a significant effect on competition and would be invalid if this
theory had been accepted in its full scope. The same, I should add, would
apply for other professional organizations, be it in the medical profession or
the accountancy profession itself. For all of them, of course, it would be true
of their autonomous regulations, and if struck by this rule would be impossible. That is the reason that the case was taken to be very serious indeed by the
bars in general, including CCBE.
I will not go into the ramifications of the case at length. You have the
decision of the European Court before you, and you will have noticed that it is
a very lengthy decision. Even so, it only deals with three or four of the issues
that were raised, whereas there were at least 15 issues before the Dutch court
when the case began. 10 We could speak of this at great length, and I would
love to do so, but I suggest that we forgo that and go immediately towards the
decision, which has itself been reported as being fully favorable to the bars,
but I think I should qualify that because on the issue most relevant, I think the
decision is unfavorable to the bars, and that is the first point covered by the
European Court, i.e., the question of whether a regulated bar is really considered an association of enterprises and therefore its decisions are, in principle,
subject to the competition rules of the Treaty.
The answer to that question, despite vigorous argument to the contrary,
was yes, bars are associations of enterprises and, in principle, their decisions
8. European Community.
9. Samenwerkingsverordening 1993 (Regulation on Joint Professional Activity 1993),
adopted by the College van Afgevaardigen (College of Delegates) of the Bar of the Netherlands.
10. Prior to referral to the European Court of Justice, the case was brought in the Raad van
State (Netherlands Council of State).
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are subject to the competition rules of the EC Treaty, which was a severe
disappointment, I'm sure, to CCBE and the Dutch Bar and all other bars that
were involved and should be a severe disappointment to other professional
organizations, including, I repeat, the accountants' organizations, because it
puts them in exactly the same position.
The second question put before the European Court was whether the regulation of 1993 on cooperation was relevant to competition, negatively relevant to competition. That is not a particularly difficult question and not
surprisingly, the European Court found that yes, if you prohibit someone from
cooperating with someone else to mutual benefit, that does have a negative
affect on competition
At that moment, it would seem that the death knell had rung over the
position defended by the Dutch bar, i.e. the rule prohibiting MDPs, because up
to that point the European Court had steadfastly taken the position that where
there was a decision or an agreement covered by Article 85, as it was at the
time, and having a negative effect on competition, there was an end to the
story. That agreement or decision or whatever was null and void, and there
would say, well, I can close the
was an end to that. So at this point, the _
decision. I know I was going to go on from there. They don't stand a chance.
Then the decision, starting at paragraph 97 and following, for those who
are avidly following this, takes a very, very surprising turn, surprising at least
to Europeans, not I expect to many American readers. The European Court
then takes up a rule of reason approach and examines whether the motives
underlying the Dutch Bar's regulation are sufficient to justify this regulation,
despite its anticompetitive effect. I think that is not surprising to a U.S. practitioner, where there is similar case law in America dating back a long time, but
it is very surprising in the European context because so far, the European
Court has steadfastly refused to apply rule of reason considerations in competition cases. There is a technical reason for that, which if you insist, I will
explain to you, but I see you are not insisting, so I won't and leave it at that.
I'm not a competition law expert, but to my knowledge, this is the first
time that the European Court has accepted rule of reason arguments in the
to
context of a competition case. You will have read or you may be __
read the opinion of Advocate General L6ger before the decision of the European Court. He sets out in paragraphs 99 and following his decision and very
succinctly and completely, what the law up to that point was and explains
that no, there is no possibility to apply the rule of reason
irrefutably _
argument in a way that the European Court subsequently did apply it. Reading
these two side by side makes you see how relatively revolutionary the decision
was in this respect.
Now in applying the rule of reason, the Court examined, as it of course
was bound to do, whether the grounds for forbidding, in a very liberal form
but all the same forbidding, MDPs in Holland were sufficient to justify that
regulation. To the great satisfaction of the CCBE and of the bars, of course
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the Court did find those grounds sufficient to justify this particular infraction,
which it is, upon the competition rules. It balanced the interests of independence and confidentiality, always the same. And yes, in the context where
there is a well regulated bar which has taken seriously its responsibility of
maintaining loyal independence and maintaining client confidentiality that is
embedded in the national system of law which respected these values, then the
bar is fully justified in making an anticompetitive regulation that forbids those
forms of cooperation that jeopardize these two values. That of course is very
heartening. It is from the highest authority in Europe that we have now heard
that these values are not royal bullshit, but are values that are taken seriously
also outside the intimate circle of those who have been discussing these values
and getting so wrought up about them for years.
The Court actually looked at the argument advanced from the side of the
accountants, which was well argued and well supported, but I do it injustice by
summarizing it and saying that it boils down to, well, these lawyer arguments
are nothing but veiled means of limiting competition and thus allowing weaker
law firms to survive instead of us more modem vehicle to overtake them. This
is an argument that has been advanced by the accountants' side of the debate
in many jurisdictions. It was advanced in the European Court at great length,
and you will see that the European Court considered and rejected that argument and said, no, these are serious and respectable values which deserve to be
upheld in a jurisdiction which has the means to do that. In that respect, it is
justifiable - and for a European, that seems absolutely revolutionary - it is
justifiable that an organization of enterprises makes a regulation that is anvery satisfactory.
ticompetitive.
The final argument that was put before the European Court, which I mentioned briefly, which was the free flow of services and the free flow of establishment, and not surprisingly, the Court used the same rule of reason
approach there. That was less revolutionary because the Court had already
accepted in earlier case law that the free flow provisions could be qualified on
rule of reason grounds.
You are looking uncomfortable, Terry, with all the time I am taking.
PROFESSOR CONE: I have found you comments delightful.
MR. HUYDECOPER: Thank you. It looks like you do not. I will draw
to a close.
What further, ladies and gentlemen? What is going to happen now? If I
knew that, I'd be rich. What I can tell you is that the accounting firms in
question have said that they intend to litigate on and to see if they can prevail
before the Dutch court authority, which has returned its case to the European
Court. I'm sure they do intend to try that, but my estimate on their chances on
that, in view of the rather straightforward reasoning of the European Court, is
that they stand very little chance indeed. The European Court has left very
little latitude for a decision other than one unfavorable to the accountants.
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What else will happen? The European Court has said that the bar can
justifiably regulate against MDPs. It has not said that a bar must do that. It
has said, in the reverse, that the fact that some bars have chosen not to regulate
against MDPs does not prove that the idea of MDP regulations is unjustified.
It has left the road open for doing it both ways, either regulating against them
or leaving them as is.
I expect that in those countries in Europe where MDPs presently are permitted that there will be no move towards prohibiting them in the future. I
also expect - I think I already said that - that in those countries where they
are prohibited, the bars will now take more seriously their task of enforcing
these regulations, which up to this point, many of them had been slow to do
because they felt that it would not get them very far while this case was pending before the European Court. So I expect the Spanish and French bars, for
instance, will pull up their socks and get down to business, to the extent that
the Spanish and French bars do get down to business. Don't misunderstand
me, they do do that, but they have their own way of doing it.
I already pointed out a serious problem in the decision, which is that it
1
begins by stating the principle that bars are subject to the competition rule."
They are organizations of enterprises, and they are subject to the competition
rule. Effectively, that means that for each and every regulation enforced over
the width of Europe, and whether it concerns dentists or lawyers or accountants - it makes no difference - it will have to be demonstrated for that
regulation to be valid, that there is sufficient rule of reason substance supporting that regulation.
For myself, I am not particularly worried as to that the majority of regulations will survive that test. I do think that we will be facing a plethora of
people attempting to avoid disciplinary punishment or other difficulties by
raising this argument in the courts and by fighting it. In fact, that has already
started. A Dutch lawyer has taken the Dutch Bar to court and argued that the
no cure, no pay rule, which is accepted in most European countries including
my own, is anticompetitive, and he has found favor before the Dutch Competition Authority, and from thereon I expect a further round of litigation, presumably ending before the European Court again in a couple of years' time. But I
was saying earlier, nearly every regulation made by nearly every professional
body has some competitive effect, so the varieties in which this argument can
now be raised and tested could be termed a lawyer's paradise perhaps, but for
others, it's rather daunting.
That concludes what I would like to say to you. My advice to any lawyer
wishing to get into close cooperation with an accountant remains either don't
do it, or look for a charming young accountant and get married to him or her.
PROFESSOR CONE: I regret that you felt that I was trying to bring to
an end a most extraordinary and most well presented exposition of what has
11. See supra note 7.
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been going on in Europe and what the European Court of Justice did two
weeks and two days ago. It's wonderful that you have come here to do that,
and we are grateful. Let's move right along because I suspect there will be
questions for you. Before we reach that point, first, Robert MacCrate, and
second, Deborah Schenk, have kindly agreed to make their own comments on
your presentation.
Robert MacCrate, who needs no introduction, particularly at this law
school, because he has taken up the habit of coming here on a fortnightly
basis.
MR. MACCRATE*: Mr. Walter, it's a special privilege to participate in
this year's Otto L. Walter Lecture and to listen to the Advocate-General's
penetrating analysis of the judgment of the European Court of Justice. He has
placed the decision in its largest context, highlighting its relation to ethical
concerns of bar organizations throughout the world.
Two weeks ago, I was here at New York Law School - fortnightly, yes
- and was presented with a birthday cake with ten candles. It was a program
entitled, "The MacCrate Report Turns Ten." It was almost ten years since the
American Bar Association's Task Force, which I had the privilege to chair,
published in July 1992 its report entitled "Legal Education and Professional
Development: An Educational Continuum." That report, with its focus on
identifying the skills and values of the American legal profession, became the
foundation for the New York State Bar Association report in the year 2000,
"Preserving the Core Values of the American Legal Profession: The Place of
Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers," 400 pages.
The first 120 pages of the 1992 report provided an overview of the American Legal Profession, which was followed by another 120 pages offering a
vision of the skills and values new lawyers should seek to acquire, and I
should say to Professor Schenk that that could never have been written without
two NYU law professors contributing.
The 2000 State Bar Report brought down to date much of that 1992 report. This later report begins with six chapters appraising the American legal
profession in the year 200. It includes separate chapters on cooperative arrangements with other professionals, Chapter 4; the organization, education,
and maintenance of a single American legal profession, Chapter 5; and the
articulation and enforcement of professional values in that unitary profession,
Chapter 6.
Now just as the European Court of Justice has now found in its decision
of February 19, the regulation of the Netherlands Bar would be justified if
necessary for the proper conduct for the practice of law in the Netherlands, our
State Bar Report concluded that the regulation of multidisciplinary practice of
lawyers in America was necessary to preserve the core values of the legal
* Robert MacCrate, Esq., is Senior Counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell, and former President
of the American Bar Association and New York State Bar Association.
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profession. The core professional values of independence, loyalty, confidentiality, and freedom from conflicts are the foundation for the regulation of both
American lawyers and Netherlands lawyers with respect to multidisciplinary
practice.
Emerson, in his essay on the sovereignty of ethics declared, drawing from
Deuteronomy, "Man does not live by bread alone." This is well to remember
when we are told that competition and the forces of the marketplace should be
the sole regulator of the legal profession.
Philadelphia lawyer Arent Fox has aptly written in his response to Dean
Daniel Fischel' s support for intertwining multiple professions, "Dan's world:
the free enterprise dream, an ethics nightmare."
The groundbreaking empirical study by Senior Research Fellow Susan
Shapiro of the American Bar Foundation entitled, "Tangled Loyalties: Conflicts of Interest in Legal Practice," which will be published this spring probably next month, reports that none of the fields studied outside the law came
even close to the legal profession in devoting resources to ferreting out and
evaluating conflicts, or even became aware of potential conflicts on a day-today basis.
In our State Bar Report, we pointed out that multidisciplinary practice has
been common among lawyers for many years, and that when such coordinating services are properly regulated by the law governing lawyers, are provided
to clients, the core values of the profession are respected and the needs of the
clients are fully served.
Since the early 1960's, lawyers and social workers together, right here in
lower Manhattan, have been addressing the legal needs of public employees
who come to that office for help. It's right over on Park Row. Working with
other professionals is a common characteristic of law practice today. The core
values of the legal profession are respected and preserved only when partnerships and other contractual arrangements that compromise the lawyer's independence of judgment, loyalty to client, avoidance of conflicts, and
maintenance of clients' confidences are avoided. This is what the ABA House
of Delegates emphatically affirmed in July 2000 when it rejected multidisciplinary partnerships and affirmed the core values in the public interest are a central concern of the America legal profession.
That's all I have to say.
PROFESSOR CONE: Thank you, Bob.
Professor Deborah Schenk is our next commentator. I am very eager to
hear what she has to say.
PROFESSOR SCHENK*: I too am delighted to participate in the Walter
Lecture today, and I too enjoyed and learned a lot from the Advocate-General's presentation.
* Professor Deborah H. Schenk is Marilynn and Ronald Grossman Professor of Taxation
at New York University School of Law.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 21

There are three points that I would like to make. First, I'm struck by how
closely the language of the opinion of the Advocate-General and the opinion
of the Court tracks the concerns that have been expressed in the MDP debate
in the United States. There was virtually nothing in either of those opinions
that wasn't familiar to me, although I must confess the undertakings part was
quite strange, but leaving that aside, the opinion demonstrates that the core
values of lawyers, especially independence and confidentiality, do in fact cross
borders. Now this should not come as a surprise to us.
The New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics,
which I formerly chaired and now serve on, as well as other ethics committees,
have permitted New York lawyers to form partnerships with non-U.S. lawyers
in cases where they share core values and there would be no threat to the core
values of U.S. lawyers, and there are a number of New York opinions that
hold lawyers can form such partnerships with European lawyers.
Second, and a more important and probably more controversial point, is
that the decision of the European Court of Justice deals with exactly what the
United States has not dealt with, that is, the presence of lawyers in accounting
firms. To take New York as an example, New York now has rules permitting
some form of multidisciplinary practice. To quote Steve Krane, "So long as
the nonlawyers do not own, control, supervise, or manage, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, the practice of law by the lawyer or law firm."
What New York nor any other state, to the best of my knowledge, has not
dealt with is the current practice of law by lawyers in accounting firms in the
United States. Unlike the Netherlands, which took steps to enforce their ban
on lawyers joining in partnerships with non-lawyers - I realize that this was a
reaction, but they did enforce it - the United States has done nothing to prevent this practice. Perhaps it is because to date, the practice has been almost
exclusively by tax lawyers, and maybe we just don't care what tax lawyers do,
although my colleagues tell me that this practice is extending to benefits practice as well, but there is no question in my mind that the activities of tax
lawyers in accounting firms in the United States would clearly be the practice
of law if those lawyers did exactly the same thing at Cleary, Gottlieb or Sullivan & Cromwell. Their activities are practically identical.
To date, the accounting firms in the United States have finessed this issue
by simply stating that their lawyers are not practicing law, despite the overwhelming evidence that that is exactly what they are doing. It's so odd to me
that lawyers, who are used to ignoring labels and looking at the substance of
transactions, have simply ignored the substance of this practice. The most
startling statement to me in the materials that we were given was a quote by
Andersen Legal in the WALL STREET JouRNAL responding to the Court's ruling.12 The spokesman for Andersen said, "This will not stop us practicing law
12. Paul Hofheinz, European Court Rules Accounting Firms Can'tBundle Legal and Auditing Services, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at C16.
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in the Netherlands, in Europe or anywhere else around the world." I'm pretty
sure he was referring to the United States.
My third point, and here I may have to disagree with Tony, relates to
Enron, which I do think is quite relevant. My third point is that the European
Court of Justice, along with Enron and Arthur Andersen, may do for the legal
profession in the United States what it has been unwilling to do for itself.
First, despite the statement from Andersen Legal, the ruling by the Court
should be a blow to accounting firms hoping to bundle accounting and legal
services in the United States. We now have a ruling from a very distinguished
court that the bundling of accounting and legal services is incompatible with
the core values of the legal profession. We also have a response to the traditional argument from the accounting firms that the lawyers' position is simply
turf protection, and thus anticompetitive. The Court acknowledged that a ban
on bundling was anticompetitive, but reaffirmed the primacy of core values
that were incompatible with bundling. In other words, competition is clearly
secondary.
Second, it strikes me that the Enron debacle has made the whole concept
of one-stop shopping much less appealing. It is not at all clear to me that firms
will actually want to employ one entity for its auditing, consulting, and taxing.
I recently was visited by a former student who practices law with a "Big Five"
firm in Europe, and he told me that in two weeks of contracts he drafted with
respect to the firm's employment, the client specified in one that the firm that
was waiting to provide audit services could not provide consulting services,
and in the other the client specified that the firm that was going to provide
audit services could not provide tax services. He was quite shocked that he
was required to put this in the contract.
Thus, the argument that clients want to have one firm providing all services may never have been true, but it seems much less likely to me to be true
today. The efficiencies or the synergy that were touted in the last decade as
being so important to business clients may now seem less important than the
desire to have a second set of eyes reviewing materials.
On the other hand, we now have some pretty damning evidence from
Enron and other cases that are arising of what happens when there is only one
set of eyes. Andersen's predicament clearly brings to the fore questions about
what I'll call internal conflicts of interest issues. We're quite familiar with the
problems raised by the fact that the legal concept of external conflicts of interest has no application to accountants. Andersen's involvement with Enron has
spotlighted the potential disaster that can arise when the professional's judgment and independence are colored by the fees earned by another professional
in the firm.
The Enron implosion should give us pause about the ability of individuals
to exercise independent judgment when involved in a multi-business partnership. It seems clear to me at least that the huge dollars that Andersen was
pulling in on the consulting business affected their judgment with respect to
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the auditing business. Why do we have any reason to believe that if we substitute legal business for auditing business, the answer would be any different.
The attempt of the SEC to disengage consulting from auditing is premised on the assumption that the consulting business would impair an accountant's auditing judgment. I have no reason to believe that the
management of accounting firms would respect the lawyer's judgment and
independence any more than they apparently respect the auditor's judgment
and independence.
Well, the New York State rules make it clear that there is nothing per se
unethical about lawyers engaging in more than one business. They also make
it clear that such activity is permissible only if the mandates of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are followed. A conflict arises and the activity is
prohibited when those rules are not or cannot be followed. Since accountants
are not required to respect the values of confidentiality, independence, or freedom from external or internal conflicts of interest, as the Enron debacle illustrates - clearly, they do not value them - a partnership in which accountants
supervise lawyers is obviously untenable.
Well, that's been clear to many lawyers throughout this debate, as Bob
MacCrate wisely notes. The opinion of the European Court of Justice and the
performance of Arthur Andersen with respect to Enron may finally make it
clear to the accountants as well.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CONE: Let's have questions or comments from the
audience.
Yes, Professor Rostain.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Hi, thank you. I have a question for Professor Schenk, actually, which has to do with your second point, which is the fact
that the American Legal profession has not done anything.
.. I
wondered what mechanisms you thought were available because it seems that
the times that the bar has attempted in an organized way to deal with unauthorized practice of law, the Justice Department rears its head and says that it's a
problem demanding competitive activity here.
The other part is that, particularly in the tax area, it seems that accountants, under the IRS rules, accountants and lawyers have been able to both
practice in front of the IRS, so I wondered if you thought there were other what legal language you thought would be available to deal with the problem
of reconciling this.
PROFESSOR SCHENK: That's a good question. There are two points I
want to make. First of all, it is true that accountants and nonaccountants, actually, can practice before the IRS, but that's not all that accountants are doing.
Accountants are planning transactions, they are preparing documents, and engaging in more kinds of transactional work, and that is not necessarily governed by the rules at the core of our practice.
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The obvious answer to your question is quite draconian, but the obvious
answer is a disciplinary violation. A disciplinary committee of any state
could, on any number of grounds, try to discipline a lawyer who is working at
an accounting firm who is sharing fees with a nonlawyer, who is working
under the supervision of a nonlawyer, who is not bound by confidentiality. I
can think of a number of grounds on which these cases could be brought. To
the best of my knowledge, no one has ever done that.
The bar could also be - a first step could simply be making a statement.
There is a very old ethics opinion in New York State and there are a couple of
opinions in other jurisdictions that say the practice of law by a lawyer in an
accounting firm is unethical, but other that that, I don't really know of any bar
association to press this issue. A statement might be a good first step.
PROFESSOR CONE: Yes, ma'am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: It's not clear to me why there are different
sets of obligations for lawyers and accountants. In your speech, you said that
with accountants, they have to think about the public interest, but lawyers only
focus on clients' interests. It's not clear to me who makes these rules and why
there are differing sets of criteria.
MR. HUYDECOPER: Let's get to who makes the rules because that's
very different depending on what jurisdiction you are in. Maybe a way to
explain it is, if you hire a lawyer, and found out after you had worked with
him for a number of years and paid him substantial fees that he was not acting
only in your interests but was also motivated by other interests, you'd be thoroughly disgusted.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: Could you answer in the abstract my question?
MR. HUYDECOPER: I thought I did.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: You are giving me an example. It's not really answering my question.
MR HUYDECOPER: I suppose, theoretically, you could argue that the
public might be prepared to accept the lawyer who is motivated by other interests. It is to us a reprehensible idea, and it seems clear to us that both the
public and the lawyer are better off with the rule as it stands, which is that the
lawyer should be motivated only by his client's interests.
I suppose in a Soviet-type approach, you could say, well, a lawyer - in
fact, it was a Soviet-type approach - the lawyer should not only have his
client's interests at heart, but also have the interests of the glorious Soviet
Republic before his eyes at all times. It's possible; it works. It doesn't work
in ways that I would approve of, but it worked.
PROFESSOR CONE: I think maybe this - I don't know that I can
become sufficiently abstract to satisfy you, but the rules that govern lawyers in
New York State are adopted by the courts. The rules that govern auditing are,
in large part, adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Appellate Division has rules for complaint about what Mr. Huydecoper has
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been talking about; the bar and the lawyer should be loyal to the client. The
Securities and Exchange Commission wants the auditors to inform the public
objectively concerning the financial condition of the audited. I hope that's
helpful.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: Not really. I was asking more philosophically as to why these two parallel professions have different obligations. Perhaps Deborah can shed some light on this question.
PROFESSOR SCHENK: I seriously doubt that I can be abstract enough,
either, but I will say, to echo something that Sydney said, the two professions
are somewhat parallel, and they are business professions, they work with the
same clients, but they serve very different functions, both here in the United
States and in Europe.
The lawyer is an advocate for a client in a representative capacity, but
quite different than the function of an account, who is to certify that this is
true. A lawyer is never or shouldn't be ever put in the position of certifying
that the facts or the materials are subject to the accounting standards or the
SEC rules.
So it seems to me that the functions of the two professions are quite
dissimilar, and as a result, the rules that would guide their behavior are, of
necessity, quite dissimilar as well. They just are designed to do two very
different things.
MR HUYDECOPER: I hate to have to be bound to the level of abstraction you seem to be insisting on. Very concretely, in the typical situation, the
client coming to the lawyer is in a mess. He has made a hash of things, he is
in deep problem, or the "s" word, and he has a very unfortunate tale to tell, and
to get this client out of this mess, the lawyer will find himself compelled to
leave a large element of what this client has told him confidential.
Now that is absolutely what an accountant cannot do. He must present a
true and full picture of the position of this client. That is the core of his function. A client who comes and tells his accountant that he is deep "s" will
henceforth have great difficulty in proceeding with that accountant because the
accountant cannot work with that information. He'll simply have to present it.
PROFESSOR CONE: In the back.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: All of you had said that in some jurisdictions,
people can practice law. There is no restriction, even if they are not lawyers or
if they don't have any legal training. How do they account for things such as
the attorney-client privilege? If somebody seeks an accountant out and gets
legal advice, is that information not privileged and protected as you were just
saying earlier?
MR HUYDECOPER: To the best of my knowledge, it's not, and mind
you, we have a variety of different jurisdictions where this kind of rule applies,
so I'm not saying that there couldn't be an exception somewhere in the north
of Finland or the south of Sweeden, but on the whole, no. The legal privilege
is restricted to the genuine bar as we know it, the professionally trained and
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regulated lawyers, and the amateurs who operate outside that do not have client confidentiality rules and do not have legal privilege.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: Doesn't that just only serve to hurt the client?
I mean, the unsuspecting client probably does not know these things and
maybe went believing that the advice he or she was given is privileged, and
may only come back to haunt the client.
MR. HUYDECOPER: I expect that that is probably true, yes, and that
makes a strong argument that this is not a desirable situation, but in fact, it is
the situation in most of Northern Europe.
PROFESSOR CONE: On the other hand, most knowledgeable clients in
Europe, where I've practiced for ten years, will want the advice of a trained
and licensed lawyer, and while the client may well be forced to listen to legal
advice from the client's concierge, lest the concierge be offended and cease
rendering the type of services the concierges render in Europe, the client will
probably rely on the advice of a trained and licensed lawyer and will not rely
on the advice of the concierge.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: I can certainly understand that with respect to
more sophisticated clients like corporations. I guess I should have been more
clear. I was more concerned with individual clients, people who have small
businesses, or...
PROFESSOR CONE: You certainly describe a risk of an unsophisticated person. They may mistake a concierge for a trained and licensed lawyer,
and that is the risk of the unsophisticated, even in New York.
MR. MACCRATE: Uh, Terry.
PROFESSOR CONE: Yes, Robert.
MR. MACCRATE: I think the history of the United States is very inis
structive on this point. We had, in the 1830's, jurisdictions - and __
one that springs to mind - where anyone could hang out a shingle saying
they give advice on all legal matters, and we learned over the decades and
more than a century to develop the attorney-client privilege, and you don't
find canons of ethics adopted for the country by the American Bar Association
until 1908. All of these things developed out of experience that the way you
protect clients and protect the public is by having such rules.
PROFESSOR CONE: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: It strikes me that kind of, in the end, the concern in various jurisdictions with protecting the values of confidentiality and
independence ought to be a concern with how the protection or absence of
those values impacts upon the way in which individuals, be they natural persons or business entities, conduct their relationships with each other or with
the state and the coercive power of the state.
I wondered if, being closer to a variety of jurisdictions, if you have any
observations as to how the differing protection or lack of protection for those
core values has in fact affected the way in which individuals or businesses
conduct their relationships with each other or conduct their relationships with
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the state. Can you point to any ways in which we can identify practical results
of the differing importance of these values in different jurisdictions?
MR HUYDECOPER: Well, an extreme example which I already mentioned was the legal practice in the former Soviet Bloc, where it was an official canon of ethics that the lawyer not only served his client's interest, but
also was held to observe the interests of the state and the people at large
which, putting it bluntly, meant he had to rip off his client if he found anything
nasty about his client had gone on, which effectively meant that people didn't
use lawyers and resorted to consigliari-type arrangements, familiar from Mario
Puzo's books, but hopefully not in practice - far from Soviet practice, but not
from practice in the West. That's putting it very extremely, but that is the way
it worked in, for instance, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
PROFESSOR CONE: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: Mr. Huydecoper, how does this issue, do you
think, play out in the European Union, where there is such a drive for a common set of rules applicable throughout the whole Community?
MR. HUYDECOPER: There certainly is such a drive, but it is fairly
utopian and it has not had very much result so far. To take a single example, I
don't think Germany will ever agree to giving up their rule that accountants
have full legal privilege. The accountants' lobby will certainly put a foot
before that. If accountants have full legal privilege, there is much less to be
said against their being allowed to amalgamate, and there is simply not sufficient political impetus to rub away that kind of distinction. I think we're going
to be faced with that perennially.
There certainly is - the CCB, which I already mentioned, is working
hard on harmonizing rules overall. It has succeeded in making a common
code of ethics, which harmonizes the most important rules. That is a major
achievement. It will be a long time before we get steps further towards resolving the disharmony that exists outside the scope of that code of conduct.
PROFESSOR CONE: Let me mention what Mr. Huydecoper has already
mentioned. There is now an establishment directive1 3 in the European Union,
adopted in 1998, giving lawyers licensed anywhere in Europe the right to practice anywhere in Europe, a very revolutionary directive.
Perhaps, being older than Tony Huydecoper, I am more optimistic. I am
inclined to think that rather rapidly over time, the existence of the Establishment Directive will lead to what the Europeans call a __
of the regulation
of the practice of law in Europe.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: Do you think it comes out the way this court
did, separating the two professions?
PROFESSOR CONE: On the issue of multidisciplinary practice?
AUDIENCE MEMBER 5: Yes.
13. Directive 98/5/EEC (1998).
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PROFESSOR CONE: A lot will depend on what the solicitors do. A
great deal will depend on what the solicitors do. Solicitors are very powerful
in Europe. They have thus far been of two minds and, as we know, the English are very accomplished at being of two minds. I think a great deal will
depend now on how the Law Society of England and Whales reacts to this
decision. If they, in effect, endorse it, I think that will be - this is my personal opinion, but you didn't come here to hear me - I guess this is my
personal opinion.
Let me quickly mention something that I never fail to point out. The
Establishment Directive was drafted in such a way that U.S. citizens get no
benefit from it. So you can go to Europe, qualify as a lawyer, and if you're a
U.S. citizen, you get no benefit.
Yes, ma'am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 6: This is perhaps beyond the legal framework,
but I'd be interested in Mr. Huydecoper's comments.
I know that somebody commented - one of the officials of the Court
commented that although the prohibition will dismiss competition and effect
cross-border business, it is compatible with EU 14 law because it is necessary
to protect the proper practice of the legal profession.
I know that in the case of the World Trade Organization, there is simply a
question about whether competition should be, for all of us, the overriding
value, or whether there are other values, in a sense, that should mitigate or
influence how decisions are reached.
I'm wondering if, in the course of the discussions here, there were issues
or comments around the question of the position of competition as a value in
relationship to other public values associated with it that you could comment
on.

MR. HUYDECOPER: Well, certainly, yes. That was a very crucial
point in the debate on which, mind you, the lawyers believed that they were
defending a tenable but very weak position because the European Court, in its
40 years of existence, has never budged and inch in the direction of allowing
other considerations to mitigate the competition rules. I was saying that there
was a technical reason for that, and maybe it is now the time to explain that.
The European Treaty provides that exemptions can be obtained from the
competition rules from the European Commission, which is the governing
body of the Community, and the Court has always held that there is no point in
having a system of exemptions if you are also going to allow similar forms of
exemptions on an unofficial basis, like qualifying the rule. That's the reason
behind it, and there is some sense in that. They have maintained that position
stalwartly until this decision.

14. European Union.
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So yes, the point was argued vigorously. Yes, apparently because it is
now accepted that competition is a good thing, but that there may be better
things that offset competition occasionally.
And finally, I do not expect that they will be prepared to go a long way to
doing this kind of thing again in future cases. I think they clearly found this an
exceptional case and an exceptional sort of competition, a regulating organization. I fully expect their next case will be, well, this was the one exception
that we did allow, and don't come asking for more exceptions.
PROFESSOR CONE: Mr. Krane.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 7: I have a question for any or all of you. This
whole multidisciplinary partnership situation is taking on the earmarks of a
bad movie, and by that I mean it's a kind of movie where the plot has unfolded, you've reached the critical point of the situation, the conflict has been
resolved, and the movie is still going on, and you are sitting there saying to
yourself, shouldn't this be over already? I say that about this debate. You
have a categorical rejection of multidisciplinary partnerships by lawyers,
we've had the Enron scandal that has heightened concerns among clients, and
we've had this determination of the European Court of Justice upholding regulation in Europe where the multidisciplinary partnership movement had its origins. No one is clamoring for multidisciplinary partnerships except maybe the
"Big Five," soon to be the "Final Four," and they have other things on their
minds right now.
So my question to you is, is this movie over?
MR HUYDECOPER: Very unlikely, I am sorry to say. As Terry Cone
already pointed out, the English solicitors are teetering on the verge, which
they have been for many years, and they will continue to teeter and as long as
they do so, there will be something to watch on your screen.
It may well be the Arthur Andersen reaction to the effect that "this is not
going to alter their practice" may mean that they intend to opt for side-by-side
cooperation forms in the form which has been accepted here in New York. In
that case, the movie would have a happy ending with the couple strolling
down the aisle and the organ playing appropriate music.
I have said I believe in part that this form of cooperation has been entered
into by big firms, Ernst & Young being one of them and Deloitte & Touche,
have done it in Holland successfully. So it can be done, and it works, and I
expect that Arthur Andersen will choose that route in the rather insignificant
jurisdiction of Holland, but they may decide to avoid problems in other jurisdictions in this form also.
PROFESSOR SCHENK: I'll just add to that, Steven. I think the bar
associations and the lawyers believe that it is over. I don't think the accountants think that it is over. My sense is that the accountants believe that the
lawyers think they stopped it by side-to-side rules, and they don't like accountants, so therefore they're going to go along their merry way, and I think things
will continue for quite awhile.
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PROFESSOR CONE: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 8: Mr. Huydecoper, you mentioned that there
were European countries - Italy is one that I recall you mentioning - that do
not prohibit multidisciplinary practices. In the plaintiffs' case, did they introduce evidence to suggest that the system worked without the kind of disastrous
results of compromising confidentiality and privilege by merging them, and
what kind of weight was made of those

?

MR. HUYDECOPER: Well, the major jurisdiction where this is allowed
is Germany, where they have this exceptional rule of confidentiality, allowing
accountants full legal privilege. So there it is not difficult to show that that
does not lead to disastrous results. The rules are significantly different.
The other major country where MDPs are allowed is Italy, and to cut a
long debate short with a rather trite remark, in Italy, it is always very easy to
show that nothing disastrous happened. It does not make a last impression
when you have shown that.
PROFESSOR CONE: I asked the leader of the Italian bar - I chatted
with him a while when I was in Rome on one occasion - what position the
Italian bar was going to take with respect to the case before the European
Court of Justice, and he said, "We're going to show solidarity with our brethren in the Netherlands as long as the case is pending before the European
Court of Justice. Once the case has been decided, we will then permit multidisciplinary practice." That is a very old and sophisticated civilization.
Sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 9: My question is addressed to the distinguished
looking gentleman. Most countries have chosen to regulate the various professions, medical and legal, for broader societal impact and need. I am intrigued
by the European Court's categorization of the legal profession as a group of
business, which opens it up to various other possibilities. Can you comment
on that?
MR. HUYDECOPER: I did say that that was a most disappointing aspect
of the decision for the bars and for professional organizations at large. I don't
think I can add very much to that. The case law of the European Court had
already been to the effect that the concept of an amalgamation of enterprises
was taken very broadly.
To give you a rather striking example, a case in the 1970s where an opera
singer was considered to be an enterprise, and a group of opera singers of
course would be an amalgamation of enterprises. It takes some imagination to
see that that is the case, but the Court has consistently taken the view that
anything done for remunerative purposes amounts to the operation of an enterprise. Given that very broad starting point, it is understandable that yes, accountants, lawyers, and physicians are enterprises. Their logic is irrefutable.
PROFESSOR CONE: The battle was fought and lost by the CCBE of the
European Bar Association in the context of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. If you look at the General Agreement on Trade in Services, and in
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particular you look at the schedules of specific commitments thereunder, you
will see that there is a category of business services. Then, under that category, among the subcategories, are professional services, and that under the
subcategory of professional services, there is a sub-subcategory called legal
services.
Now, there were many protests in the European bars in particular against
that hierarchy in the Uruguay Round, and those protests fell on deaf ears. So
there is now multilateral treaty authority for the proposition that legal services
are a sub-subcategory of business services.
Any other questions? Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 9: To extend this logic, a government employee
or a head of a department or even a minister is paid a salary. So everyone, for
rendering any kind of service, receives a remuneration.
PROFESSOR CONE: There is an exception right at the beginning of the
GATS 15 for governments.
MR. HUYDECOPER: So is there in the EC Treaty. From personal experience, I can tell you the remuneration the government pays is very modest.
PROFESSOR CONE: Sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 10: Mr. Huydecoper, what do think the reaction
of the Commission 16 is to this decision, and are they going to, for example, try
to establish an exception for the legal profession to sort of carve away this
little

MR. HUYDECOPER: My estimate is the Commission is quite as uncomfortable with this part of the decision as professional organizations are.
They have also seen that this is not a problem unique to the legal profession,
but that it will prop up in all professions that have regulations, and I don't
think they are looking forward to interfering with that and setting up a system
to deal with that. The Commission has often been known to solve problems
by shelving them and trying to keep them out of the way for a couple of years.
I definitely think they would be very uncomfortable if they were compelled to
set up policy and to set up regulations that are applicable to all professions
Europe-wide. It would be a terrible job for them for which they are neither
prepared nor particularly inclined to seek to do it.
PROFESSOR CONE: Are there any other questions?
I think that we are all greatly in the debt of Tony Huydecoper, Bob MacCrate, and Deborah Schenk. I personally am extremely grateful that you could
come here. You have been so wonderfully informative and articulate, and I
want to thank you.

15. General Agreement on Trade in Services.
16. European Commission.

